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The Yellow Peril 
 
As an antithesis to the narrative of European superiority, the fear of Japan and China has had a place in 
the history of Europe since the 1890s, when the term was adapted from North America. Customarily, the 
term ‘Yellow Peril’ has been analysed as a political and social catchword. In this essay, I argue instead 
that three media events played a crucial role in its emergence and gradual intensification: the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894/95, the Boxer War of 1900/01 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05. They left a 
legacy that has cast a long shadow over the twentieth century. 
 
The period from the 1870s to the outbreak of the First World War saw the high water mark 
of ‘Western’ imperialism. One of the building blocks of imperialism was the idea of a 
‘Western’ civilising mission in other parts of the world, grounded in technological progress 
and moral as well as cultural advancement.1 But this notion of superiority had a downside to 
which it was attached in a dialectical relationship: the insecurity of the imperialists and their 
fear of the subjugated and colonised peoples.2 One of the guises in which this angst 
manifested itself was the idea of the ‘Yellow Peril’ (alternatively: ‘yellow menace,’ ‘yellow 
spectre’). This discursive formation insinuated that Europe and North America were somehow 
under threat from the peoples of East Asia, which had been contained by means of ‘unequal 
treaties’ since the 1840s. So far, the ‘Yellow Peril’ has usually been analysed in terms of a 
catchphrase informing political and social debates.3 As such, it is viewed as a more or less 
continuous debate that originated in the United States in the 1870s, spilled over into Europe 
(where it was prefigured by previous discussions on the ‘Russian’ or the ‘American’ menace) 
in the 1890s and continued up until the First World War, into the interwar period and beyond. 
In my essay, I shall build on this research but link the ‘Yellow Peril’ rhetoric with two media 
events: the Boxer War of 1898-1901 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/1905. 
 
 
The ‘Yellow Peril’ between discourse and media event 
 
There were several dimensions to the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse.4 Prior to 1905, it was 
mainly about economics and centred on the long-term effects of imperialism. While in the 
short run the imperialist framework might create profits from overseas markets, it was argued, 
in the long run it would lead to the industrialisation of Japan and China and thus foster 
economic competition, to the detriment of ‘Western’ economies. This had practical 
consequences. In 1896 and 1897, Britain, the United States and the German Reich each 
dispatched a commission to East Asia to study economic conditions there; in all three cases, 
their reports emphasised the tangible benefits rather than the potential dangers of ‘Western’ 
economic engagement.5 Related to the fear of economic competition was that of East Asian 
(in particular Chinese) labour migration, which evoked the spectre of cheap Chinese labourers 
out-competing those in North America and Europe. It was this fear that first led to the 
emergence of the catchphrase ‘yellow peril’ in the United States, in particular California. 
Anti-Chinese resistance forced the US political institutions to react, which they did by passing 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, a law that severely curtailed Chinese labour migration.6 
The notion of Chinese labour competition gained some popularity in Europe as well and was 
occasionally fuelled by palpable initiatives. For example, local administrators and 
landowners’ associations in West Prussia repeatedly suggested recruiting Chinese agricultural 
labourers in the 1890s and 1900s, as the available labour force was scarce. The idea sparked a 
controversial debate in which social and cultural stereotypes were mustered against the import 
of Chinese labour.7 Indeed the German Social Democratic Party had warned against Chinese 
labour competition and used the catchphrase of the ‘Yellow Peril’ for a more general critique 
of capitalism. The International Socialist Congresses of the 1900s almost split over the 
question of whether labour competition from outside Europe should be excluded until this 
motion was finally rejected in 1907. 
Finally, there was the political dimension, which viewed the ‘Yellow Peril’ primarily as a 
political and military threat to Europe and North America. On the one side of the political 
spectrum, anti-imperialists such as Johann von Bloch and Hermann von Samson-
Himmelstjerna held imperialism directly responsible for the emergence of the ‘Yellow Peril,’ 
as it had fostered hatred of the ‘West’; they considered it necessary to come to terms with the 
peoples of East Asia. On the other end, the popularity of the ‘theory of world empires’ 
(Weltreichslehre) invited speculation about a future realignment of global power in which 
Europe would lose its position at the helm. In addition to the United States and Russia, East 
Asia was envisioned as another up-and-coming challenger.8 
Looking at the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse in the way outlined above means discussing it in 
terms of a steady and continuous intellectual trajectory. Viewing it as a media event, as this 
essay does, requires an altogether different approach. Media events are both “high holidays of 
mass communication”9 disrupting the ordinary flow of life and condensations of social 
discourses or debates;10 they thrive on their (in the literal sense of the term) extra-ordinary 
character while bringing deeper concerns to the fore. In this sense, the focus must be not so 
much on the steady development of the discourse, but at the ruptures created by the three 
events that are usually mentioned as catalysts for the development of the ‘Yellow Peril’ 
discourse: the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/1895, the Boxer War of 1900/1901 and the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904/1905. While the former functioned as a prelude of sorts, the two latter 
were full-blown global media events sustained by a modern and sophisticated technological 
apparatus. Coverage of the Boxer War rested on the telegraph network that by 1900 spanned 
the entire globe and to which China had first been connected as early as the 1870s.11 
Likewise, Lionel James’s reports from the Russo-Japanese War to the London Times were the 
first wireless transmissions in the history of journalism.12 The relationship between media 
events and ‘real’ events awaits further clarification; suffice it to say here that although both 
exhibit the “minimum of ‘before’ and ‘after’” providing “the significant unity that makes an 
event out of incidents”,13 what is happening ‘on the ground’ and in the media is not 
congruent. As ‘real’ events, all three wars came to a formal conclusion through agreements––
however unilateral––reached in peace negotiations: the treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, the 
Boxer Protocol of September 1901 and the peace treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. Neither the 
Boxer Protocol nor the Portsmouth treaty put a stop to the media coverage of the war, 
however; for the Boxer War in particular, it can be shown that publications continued in the 
wake of the peace settlement. This was especially true of the book market in the ‘West,’ 
which was now swamped with eyewitness accounts from participants, be they soldiers or 
missionaries.14 Finally, it should be noted that in a sense, both ‘real’ and media events are 
constructs in that they are carved out of a continuum of human action and communication. 
 
 
Prelude: The Sino-Japanese War of 1895 
 
Although as a global media event, the first Sino-Japanese War was dwarfed by the two 
subsequent wars in 1900/01 and 1904/05 respectively, its catalytic function for the ‘Yellow 
Peril’ discourse is beyond dispute. Its impact varied, however. While the catchword appeared 
regularly in the French and Belgian press since the war, it seems to have caused only a short 
flaring-up in Germany where it resurfaced only in 1900. The Boxer War of 1900/1901 also 
marked the point at which the ‘Yellow Peril’ made its first public appearance in Britain and 
the United States.15 
There can be no doubt that the war between the East Asian island state and its larger 
continental neighbour marked an important point in what the American historian Robert 
Eskildsen has called Japan’s “mimetic imperialism”. By this term he refers to Tōkyō’s 
strategy of emulating ‘Western’ imperialism, which, he argues, had been part and parcel of 
the Meiji reforms since their beginning in 1868.16 Japan began by annexing the Ryūkyū 
Islands, a tributary state of the Chinese Empire, which it renamed Okinawa prefecture, in 
1879; as a result of the 1894/1895 war, it acquired its first colony, the island of Taiwan. 
Owing to a combination of formal colonialism and informal rights exercised in China, by the 
1890s Japan had successfully demonstrated its status as an equal to the European powers and 
the USA. Ironically, at the time of its war against China, the Japanese Empire was constrained 
by the same ‘unequal treaties’ that also bound the Imperial government in Beijing. By 1899, 
however, Japan had negotiated with the European imperialist powers the abrogation of the 
treaties and as a result regained full sovereignty in 1912.17 
It was the peace settlement of 1895 that sparked the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse. Although the 
British had suggested a diplomatic intervention as early as October 1894, the ‘Western’ 
powers did not become involved until the peace negotiations in the Japanese city of 
Shimonoseki had got underway. They were suspicious of Japan’s intent on acquiring not only 
Taiwan, but also the Liaodong peninsula at the southern tip of Manchuria, viewing cessation 
of the latter as a threat to stability in East Asia. For this reason, Russia orchestrated a joint 
diplomatic intervention of some European powers––while Britain stayed aloof, France and 
Germany participated––, forcing Japan to go back on its claim.18 
It is against the background of a perceived Japanese threat of the status quo that the 
‘Yellow Peril’ discourse emerged in Europe, with the German Emperor Wilhelm II assuming 
a central role––not so much because of his exaggerated claims to have coined the phrase,19 
but because he created one of the most powerful symbols: the painting “Peoples of Europe, 
protect your most sacred values!” (Völker Europas, wahrt eure heiligsten Güter). As the 
Kaiser himself explained in a letter to the Czar in September 1895, “[i]t shows the powers of 
Europe represented by their respective Genii called together by the Arch-Angel-Michael,— 
sent from Heaven,— to unite in resisting the inroad of Buddhism, heathenism  and barbarism 
for the Defence of the Cross.”20 The painting was drafted by the Kaiser, who proudly asserted 
his authorship of the painting, and executed by his former painting teacher Hermann 
Knackfuß (1848-1915). As Philipp Gassert has argued, Wilhelm instrumentalised the idea of 
the ‘Yellow Peril’ as part of a diplomatic diversion, his aim being to redirect the Russian gaze 
away from the Reich’s Eastern border and towards East Asia.21 But the impact of the Kaiser’s 
intervention went far beyond its immediate context. Despite being almost immediately 
adapted by satirical magazines critical of the Kaiser and his policies,22 the ‘Peoples of 
Europe’ painting and its concomitant rhetoric became a long-term symbol that could be drawn 
upon by various parties in subsequent debates, beginning with the Boxer War in 1900. 
 
 
The Boxer War (1900-1901) and the threat in/from East Asia 
 
Much more than the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer War23 was a media event of global 
proportions. The intervention of eight states (Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States) in China was driven by a sense of crisis that 
revealed long-standing anxieties about the role and destiny of the ‘Western’ presence in East 
Asia. The emergence of the Boxer movement in 1898-1900 and its subsequent support by the 
Imperial government of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) seemed to mark a dramatic break with 
the established treaty system, by which China had been subjected to European commercial 
and financial imperialism.24 As Europeans viewed the imperialist order not only in economic 
terms, but in fact as a civilising mission, it appeared obvious to them to frame the Boxer War 
in terms of a conflict between civilisation and barbarism.25 
It is important to note, however, that coverage of the war was not simply dominated by the 
‘Yellow Peril’ discourse. As the conflict between China and the European powers (as well as 
the US and Japan) came to a head in the spring and summer of 1900, European daily 
newspapers and periodicals focused on a number of topics: the threat to the lives of 
Europeans residing in China, first at the hands of the Boxers and subsequently during the 
sieges of the European quarters at Beijing and Tianjin; the breach of international law 
manifesting itself, above all, in the murder of the German minister Clemens von Ketteler and 
the Japanese legation secretary Count Sugiyama; and the sluggish process of relief operations 
that eventually culminated in the relief of Tianjin in mid-July and of Beijing in mid-August 
1900.26 To a considerable extent, such reporting relied on telegraphic dispatches, and, as 
communication with the besieged European communities in China was cut off, frequently 
resorted to speculation and rumour-mongering, which culminated in the claim that all 
Europeans in Beijing had been massacred. It took European journalists and audiences a while 
to realise they had fallen for a hoax.27  
After the relief of Beijing, with more correspondents on the ground and more 
comprehensive information available through detailed letters rather than sparse telegrams, the 
focus of attention shifted to the conduct of the Allied troops in China. The atrocities 
committed by them gave rise to a controversial debate about the merits and demerits of the 
multinational intervention and, more generally, of the transnational informal empire in 
China.28 This controversy spilled over into the political arena and led to impassionate debates 
in parliament, at least in Germany and to a lesser degree in France. Such political 
controversies relied directly on news reporting and indirectly on soldiers’ letters sent home 
from the Chinese theatre of war and subsequently published in the press. The German journal 
Vorwärts, the mouthpiece of the Social Democratic Party, systematically gleaned such letters 
from local papers, as did its French counterpart L’Aurore, albeit less thoroughly.29 
To the extent that the Boxer War was a media event, it was centred on the threat to the 
imperialist framework in China. This, however, had little to do with the arguments generally 
associated with the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse. The main thrust of media coverage was 
unrelated to the question of economic or labour competition. What remained was the political 
and military threat - but the media generally agreed that this took place in China, not in 
Europe itself. There was, however, considerable sensationalism in the way that some 
publications conjured up the spectre of a general “upheaval of the yellow world”.30 While the 
Boxers are today recognized as a merely regional movement limited to the North and 
Northeast of China, it appeared to contemporary observers that they were also behind unrest 
in other parts of the Empire. For example, the French journal La Dépêche reported in mid-
July 1900 that “the [Boxer] uprising extends into all provinces of the [Chinese] empire and 
that new massacres are to be feared, notably at Wen-Chou, Tai Chow, Che Kiang and Che-
Fou”.31 
However tenuously the idea of an all-out war against foreigners in China may have been 
linked to that of a political-military threat that the ‘yellow races’ presented to Europe, it 
shows that the discourse on the ‘Yellow Peril’ could be fused into the coverage of the Boxer 
War. For one thing, the former could provide a framework for understanding the latter. In a 
letter to the editor of the London Times, the author argued that “[t]he ‘Yellow Peril’ seems to 
have come upon us, not in the external form in which it presented itself to some fervid 
imaginations, but in China itself.”32 What was threatened by the rebellion of the Boxers, he 
argued, was not only the lives of every foreigner in China, but also the immense capital 
investments made in the country––an indirect attack on the British economy. There is also 
reason to believe that many of the European troops in China interpreted their mission in the 
same way, and some of these ideas found their way into the press. Note, for example, the 
description of conversation with French officers by the French war correspondent Gaston 
Donnet (1867-1908), himself a firm believer that China was to all intents and purposes a 
petrified society and culture:  
“And all these people are of the same opinion: they all recognize the Yellow Peril, they 
all persuade themselves that in ten years––possibly less––it will be necessary to begin 
afresh [to make war on China, T.K.]. See for example, they tell me, the progress that the 
Chinese army has made since its campaign against Japan in 1895. See the fulgurous 
example of Japan itself. And what is Japan, if not the extension of China? As the 
Japanese can have the most up-to-date cannon, why shouldn’t the Chinese have them 
too?”33 
Secondly, politicians sought to infuse ideas about the ‘Yellow Peril’ into discussions on the 
Boxer War. The most prominent example, once more, was the German Emperor. Wilhelm’s 
‘Huns Speech,’ delivered to German troops en route to China, has unjustly been referred to as 
an example of the ‘Yellow Peril’ rhetoric. In fact, the Kaiser exhorted his soldiers to wage a 
relentless campaign of revenge in China, but his address, hyperbolic as it may have been, was 
very much in line with the discourse on civilisation and barbarism.34 Wilhelm did, however, 
recycle ‘his’ painting Peoples of Europe, which he donated to several troop transports, in an 
obvious attempt to link the campaign in China with the ‘Yellow Peril’.35 Whereas this rather 
tenuous connection had more political and military overtones, the French deputy Paul Henri 
d’Estournelles de Constant (1852-1924) was more explicit in linking the military outcome of 
the Allied intervention with the economic danger posed by China, although what constituted 
this danger remained rather vague:  
“If this action [of Europe in China] does not succeed in re-establishing order, we will 
have lost, without benefit, men, money and respect; if, on the contrary, it succeeds in 
developing China, beware lest the first result of this operation be the increase of our 
costs and the debasement of our European products, which means social revolution.”36 
Finally, the events transpiring from China in 1900 and 1901 could serve as a catalyst for more 
long-term debates on the ‘Yellow Peril’. As a media event, the Boxer War did not end––as 
did the political and military crisis––with the signing of the Boxer Protocol in September 
1901. As the coverage in the daily press and in periodicals gradually petered out, a flood of 
publications on the Boxer War hit the book market, some of which sought to make sense of 
the recent calamities in terms of the ‘Yellow Peril’. Other volumes dealt more specifically 
with the ‘Yellow Peril,’ but the timing of their publication indicates that they were inspired by 
the Boxer crisis. 
An example of the former is Sir Robert Hart’s These from the Land of Sinim, written in 
part during the Boxer crisis and published in the year of its formal conclusion. Hart, the 
Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service and a long-time resident in 
Beijing, had himself been in the siege of the Legations Quarter in the summer of 1900. 
Regarding the Boxers as Chinese patriots, he took them as proof that “the future will have a 
‘yellow’ question––perhaps a yellow ‘peril’–– to deal with,” which he regarded as nothing 
less than threatening “the world’s future.”37 Like many other commentators, he also 
acknowledged the dangers that an arms build-up in China might entail: “The Boxer patriot of 
the future will possess the best weapons money can buy, and then the ‘Yellow Peril’ will be 
beyond ignoring.”38 Hart differed from many of his fellow commentators, however, in the 
countermeasures he proposed, arguing that a more tactful and equitable treatment of China 
was the best way to avert any danger that might emanate from the country.39 On the whole, 
however, European reactions to the Boxer crisis were dwarfed by those to the Russo-Japanese 
War four years later, the course of which seemed to bring home to Europeans more clearly 
their apparent vulnerability. 
 
 
The Russo-Japanese War and the fear of Japan (and, by extension, China) 
 
As a media event, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904/1905 was of a different calibre compared 
to the international intervention in China four years previously. While the latter had indeed 
seen fighting between modern-equipped armies, attention was equally focused on the 
allegedly ‘primitive’ Boxers. The former war of 1904/1905, on the other hand, pitted two 
modern military systems against one another and ended with a resounding strategic victory of 
a non-European over a European power.40 Besides, in contrast to the Boxer War, sympathies 
were divided this time. Public opinion in many European states at the time was not well-
disposed towards Russia. Even in France, which was officially allied with the Czar and his 
government, the press seems to have been divided. While some papers and periodicals viewed 
Russia as Europe’s protector from the (Japanese) ‘yellow peril,’ others conjured up the 
spectre of a ‘Russo-Mongolian bloc’ poised for world domination.41  
By contrast, Britain had concluded an alliance with Japan in 1902 and for this reason took 
a more positive view of the Japanese war effort. This is embodied in the detailed account of 
Japan’s Fight for Freedom by Herbert Wrigley Wilson, which was first published in 
fortnightly instalments between April 1904 and May 1906.42 The publication is also an 
indication of how quickly the media market responded to the war with customised forms of 
publication; a similar publication was Gaston Donnet’s Histoire de la guerre Russo-
Japonaise, which appeared weekly.43 The division of sympathies was due to the fact that this 
time, war correspondents and army officers were observing both sides; thus the non-European 
side––perhaps for the first time–– received extensive and sympathetic first-hand coverage. It 
is true that in offsetting the seeming progress made by Japan against the alleged “half Asian”, 
autocratic backwardness of Russia, European commentators demonstrated a great deal of 
complacency. For example, the Revue hebdomadaire published a comment to the effect that 
“Japan had offered to the world the extraordinary spectacle of a people abandoning an 1,200- 
year-old civilisation in favour of that of another race”.44 The question, however, remained, to 
what extent this adaptation of European civilisation could be turned against Europe itself, and 
this question became the focus of the debate. 
As some of the above comments indicate, media coverage of the Russo-Japanese War 
differed from that of the Boxer War on a number of counts: First, it was more tightly 
interwoven with the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse, and also at an earlier stage of the conflict. A 
second difference concerned the scope of the backlash. Whereas the Boxer War had 
imperilled Europeans in the Qing Empire and China’s future rise was at best dimly visible on 
the horizon, the Russo-Japanese War seemed to signal more imminent dangers to Europe 
itself. Thirdly, it appears that a far larger number of eminent contributors to the ‘Yellow Peril’ 
debate took their cue from Japan’s victory over the Czarist empire than from the Boxer crisis. 
One of these was the German missionary Martin Maier, who by his own account was 
responding to questions addressed to him upon his return from China. Maier did not 
distinguish between Japan and China, in part because he attributed the ‘Yellow Peril’ to racial 
differences as well as hatred of the ‘Western’ foreigners in both countries.45 He distinguished 
between a political or military threat, in which he did not believe, and economic competition 
between East Asians and Europeans. Perhaps owing to his profession, he also warned against 
the undermining of European ethical achievements through the egotism and materialism of 
the Chinese and Japanese.46  
In contrast to Maier, the German archivist C. Spielmann brought some experience to the 
task. His book Arier und Mongolen (Aryans and Mongols), which first appeared in 1905 and 
was republished in 1914, drew on two previous works written after the Sino-Japanese War 
and on the eve of the Boxer War. Spielmann took a stand against a perceived enthusiasm for 
Japan in the German public, placing the Russo-Japanese War in the larger context of a 
perennial conflict between Aryans and Mongols, in which the latter were now poised for 
supremacy, not through spiritual but technological superiority and the sheer force of the 
masses.47 Like other like-minded writers, Spielmann conjured up the idea of a future Chinese 
military machine under Japanese guidance that might stage a remake of the medieval Mongol 
invasion––although this was rather a playing on deep-rooted cultural fears than a sober 
analysis.48 But to him peaceful Chinese emigration presented an equally serious threat, a 
“swamping of the world which must cause great alarm to the white race”.49  
Like Spielmann, the Englishman Bertram Lennox Simpson (writing under the pseudonym 
B.L. Putnam Weale), a participant in the siege of the Beijing legations in 1900, was writing 
against the largely positive attitude towards Japan in his country and elaborated his attitude in 
various works. Unlike his congenial German colleague, however, he had thoroughly revised 
his former Japan-friendly attitude by the time he published his monumental The Coming 
Struggle in Eastern Asia. Without actually using the term ‘Yellow Peril’, Simpson 
polemicized against the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, which he deemed unable to 
safeguard British interests in view of increasing commercial competition, e.g. in China.50  
Superficial as they may have been, these books purported to be analysing the situation. 
However, the ‘Yellow Peril’ might also be invoked to play on fears of invasion which were a 
common obsession across Europe in the 1900s. This is achieved in L’invasion jaune, 
published by the then popular French writer Capitaine Danrit (pseudonym of Colonel Emile-
Cyprien Driant) in 1909. The last of an entire series on imaginary wars by the same author, 
L’invasion jaune describes a joint Japanese-Chinese invasion of Europe, which culminates in 
the occupation of the Chamber of Deputies in Paris before it can finally be stopped.51 
It is doubtful whether Danrit’s horror fantasies or the more ‘serious’ analyses represented 
the majority or even a significant portion of public opinion. To say the least, a substantial 
number of authors were convinced that “the ‘Yellow Peril’ was only a speculation”.52 More 
importantly, the champions of the ‘Yellow Peril’ rhetoric failed to grasp the real political-
military tensions between East Asia and Europe. The ideology of Pan-Asianism, which gained 
currency in Japan (and to an extent in China) in the early twentieth century, did indeed 
propagate a defensive front of Asian peoples against white imperialism.53 Although (or rather 
because) Japan remained a faithful ally of Britain in the First World War, it demanded 
concessions after the war. The abortive push for racial equality at the Paris Peace Conference 
did not aim at imposing a universal principle, but at ending anti-Japanese discrimination, 
reflecting Japan’s insecurities as a non-white power. To an extent at least, it was also a 
reaction to the ‘Yellow Peril’ rhetoric.54 In the 1930s and during the Second World War, 
Japan increasingly cast itself as the champion of Asian liberation from ‘white’ colonialism. In 
clinging to Eurocentric fantasies, the ‘Yellow Peril’ literature missed out on what was really 
(and realistically) at stake. 
 
 Legacies 
 
Buzzwords have a long life; they do not die. Instead, they lend themselves to all sorts of 
adaptations. The ‘Yellow Peril’ is no exception: its use has changed, but has continued 
without any real interruption until the present day.55 
Heinz Gollwitzer was probably right in stating that the broad effect of the ‘Yellow Peril’ 
rhetoric never again reached the dimensions it had assumed between 1895 and 1907 (although 
he was probably wrong in assuming that it had been almost completely eclipsed by the First 
World War).56 This was also the period when the discourse was most openly tied to specific 
media events. It would appear that this connection was lost in the interwar period, although 
China’s anti-imperialist movement of the 1920s would have lent itself for making a 
connection. Perhaps the Japanese expansion from the late 1930s came closest to arousing a 
response similar to that of the Russo-Japanese War, but even so the context had changed. The 
‘Yellow Peril’ now had a past as well as a present. Commenting in January 1938 on a speech 
by the Japanese Minister of the Interior, Admiral Suetsugu, Le Temps warned against his 
“veritable war cry against the white peoples” and continued:  
“If such concepts should indeed prevail in certain governing circles in Tokyo, one 
cannot have any illusions about the evolution of Japanese politics, which are completely 
directed by the most active military and naval elements. The Yellow Peril, of which the 
German ex-emperor once spoke, would then become a reality, and the entire white 
world would have the duty to face it in full awareness of the solidarity of the peoples 
attached to civilisation, which has created present-day human society.”57  
On the one hand, anti-Japanese sentiment was running high in the United States during the 
Pacific War, but it was not directed against a ‘yellow race’ in general. Indeed, this would have 
made little sense, as China had become a sufficiently important ally of the US and Americans 
had been sympathetic if patronising observers of its war against Japan.58 
On the other hand, the term ‘Yellow Peril’ underwent a degree of trivialisation, as it could 
be adapted to other areas of European-East Asian competition, for example in sports.59 As 
early as the interwar period, race horses were named after what had once been perceived as an 
all-out menace to European civilisation.60 But the entry of the discourse into popular culture 
was not always so harmless. A good example is the figure of the Chinese master criminal Fu 
Manchu, the hero-villain of a book series created by the British author Sax Rohmer 
(pseudonym of Arthur Henry Sarsfield Ward, 1883-1959) between 1912 and the late 1950s. 
The novels were quickly adapted into films, thirteen of which were released between 1921 
and 1968.61 In all versions, Fu is depicted as a superhuman criminal combining a brilliant 
intellect with extraordinary physical prowess. Commanding the ‘yellow’ underworld, he 
carries the Asian threat into the heart of the ‘Western’ metropolises, London in particular.62 
The Fu Manchu stories can be read as the depoliticised, but still politically relevant, offshoot 
of a political discourse. 
However, the idea of the ‘Yellow Peril’ retained its importance in political and economic 
debates. After the successful Communist takeover in 1949, it blended with the red scare of the 
emerging Cold War.63 In subsequent decades, it has underpinned apprehensions about the 
economic rise of Japan and––yet more recently––of China. Yet since the interwar period, the 
‘Yellow Peril’ rhetoric has been more of a steady discourse and not associated with strictly 
circumscribed media events. 
 
Thoralf Klein, Loughborough 
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